Market-driven agents (MDAs) are negotiation agents that make adjustable amounts of concession by considering factors such as competition, deadlines, and trading options. While previous work demonstrates the properties of MDAs by experiments, this paper provides mathematical analyses to show that (1) for a given market situation, an MDA makes minimally sufficient concession, and (2) the strategies adopted by MDAs are in equilibrium. The results show that MDAs are stable (stability is an essential evaluation criterion for negotiation agents) and they avoid making excessive or inadequate concession in a market situation.
INTRODUCTION
Although there are many extant negotiation agents designed for e-commerce ( [1, 2] , just to name a few because of space limitation), strategies adopted by these agents do not take the dynamics of the market into consideration. This paper presents a market-driven model [3] for designing negotiation agents (section 2), and proves that for a given market situation, a market-driven agent (MDA) does not over-compromise or under-compromise (section 3) and the strategies adopted by MDAs are stable (section 4). In dynamic markets where products/services become available, and traders enter and leave a market, the condition for deliberation changes as new opportunities and threats are constantly being introduced. Additionally, negotiation is also bounded by time, since deadline puts negotiators under pressure [4] . Previous empirical results [5] show that in general, MDAs [3, 5, 6] outperform fixed strategy negotiation agents [1] in many situations. In [4] , a more flexible negotiation model defines a range of strategies and tactics for generating (counter-)proposals based on time, resource and behaviors of negotiators. The major difference between this work and [4] is that other essential factors such as competition, trading alternatives and differences among negotiators' proposal are also considered. In multilateral negotiations, it is intuitive to think that a negotiator's bargaining power is affected by the number of competitors and trading alternatives. Good options give a negotiator more "power" because the negotiating party needs not pursue the negotiation with any sense of desperation [7, p157] , and negotiations may break down because the parties cannot resolve their differences [8, p94] . However, this work does not compete with [1] , [4] or the current literature, but rather complements them by modeling the behaviors of negotiation agents in changing market situations. In designing MDAs [5, 6] , factors such as competition, trading alternatives, differences among negotiators and deadline are taken into account when an agent determines the amount of concession at each negotiation round (section 2).
A MARKET-DRIVEN MODEL FOR DESIGNING NEGOTIATION AGENTS
In making concession, an MDA assesses the probability p of successfully completing a deal in different market situations. One way to assess p is to consider the value of k -the spread (difference) between an agent's bid/offer and that of others [3] . trading partners, the probability that a is not the most preferred partner of all its trading partners is
Hence, in round i, the probability that a is considered the most preferred trading partner by at least one agent is:
If there is a very large number of trading partners n a i , then the chances of being considered the most preferred trading partner by some parties is higher. When the number of competitors m a i increases significantly, the likelihood of being considered the most preferred trading partner becomes much lower. These claims were proven in [3] .
Deadline: T(t,τ,λ) is a time-dependent function given as:
where t is current trading time, τ is the deadline, and λ is a nonnegative temporal sensitivity factor. At the start of negotiation (t=0), an MDA offers its initial price since
; when its deadline is reached, the MDA offers its reserve (final) price
. Although agents can select from an infinitely many strategies with respect to remaining trading time (one for each value of λ, where λ ≥ 0), they can be classified as follows [3] :
1) Linear: λ=1 and T (t, τ, ε)=1-(t/τ).
An MDA makes a constant rate of concession.
2) Conservative:
λ ]k i where λ>1, an MDA makes smaller concession in early rounds and larger concessions in later rounds.
λ ]k i where λ<1, an MDA makes larger concessions in the early trading rounds and smaller concessions at the later stage.
4) The extreme and special cases when λ = 0 (always giving in) and λ = ∝ (never give in) will not be considered because they represent the situations when no negotiation is needed and non-negotiable trading respectively. In [10] MDAs are designed with a time-dependent function T(t,τ,ε)=1-(t/τ) 1/ε that models its degree of sensitivity to approaching deadlines with respect to the MDA's eagerness ε. ε represents the user's desire to complete the deal. Given 2 agents a 1 and a 2 with the same deadline τ 1 =τ 2 , but different eagerness ε 1 and ε 2 with ε 1 > ε 2 then at time t, T(t,τ 1 ,ε 1 )<T(t,τ 2 ,ε 2 ); a 1 having higher eagerness makes more concessions than a 2 . Consequently, a 1 adopts a strategy that is more likely to complete a deal faster. This corresponds with the intuition that negotiators that are more eager to complete a deal are more likely to concede faster. In [10] , MDAs are designed with only conservative (with 0<ε<1) and linear strategies (with ε=1).
MINIMALLY SUFFICIENT CONCESSION
Given the current market situation, an MDA strives to attain the highest possible utility while maintaining a reasonable probability p of reaching a consensus. However, both increasing an MDA's utility and increasing p are incompatible objectives. One way to deal with incompatible objectives is to determine the most important objective, and express all other objectives as constraints. For MDAs, maximizing utility is the most important objective, but they are also designed to maintain a minimum p. This section shows that with respect to opportunity and competition (propositions 1 and 2) , the amount of concession made by an MDA is minimally sufficient [11] .
Definition 1:
A sufficient concession is one that increases a market-driven agent's probability of reaching a consensus. Definition 2: A concession ∆k is minimally sufficient if it achieves the highest possible utility for a market-driven agent while maintaining a minimum probability p min of reaching a consensus.
Proposition 1:
With respect to trade opportunity, the amount of concession ∆k opp made by a market-driven agent is minimally sufficient.
Proof:
The proof proceeds by induction on the number of trading partners n. 
. Inadequate concession: Let ∆k u be any amount of concession such that ∆k u <∆k opp and p u be the corresponding probability of reaching a consensus if the MDA concedes with ∆k u . Although ∆k u generates a higher utility for the MDA because the corresponding spread 
Let r be any one of the N trading partners of the MDA. Let ∆k r be the amount of concession that the MDA makes to r. Let 
such that ∆k opp =∆k N-1 ×∆k r . By induction hypothesis, ∆k N-1 is minimally sufficient. Since ∆k N-1 and ∆k r. both are minimally sufficient, it follows that ∆k opp is also minimally sufficient ♦ Proposition 2: With respect to competition in a given market size with m numbers of competitors and n numbers of trading partners, the amount of concession ∆k com made by a market-driven agent is minimally sufficient.
Proof: Since market-driven agents are utility maximizing agents, a market-driven agent B 1 is not likely to reach a consensus with another market-driven agent S i if B 1 's proposal is not ranked as the best proposal by S i . Suppose B 1 has n trading partners and m competitors. Let E 1 , E 2 , …, E n-1 , E n be the events that B 1 's proposal is not ranked the best proposal by exactly 1, 2, …, n-1, n other trading partners respectively. The worst case scenario is E n , when B 1 's proposal is not ranked the best proposal by all of its n trading partners, in which case, it is most unlikely to reach a consensus with any S i ∈S. Let P c be the probability of conflict with respect to competition. P c is the largest possible when B 1 's proposal is not ranked as the best proposal by all S i ∈S. Let p be the probability of reaching a consensus. Since p=1-P c , with respect to competition, p is the smallest possible when E n occurs. 
SEQUENTIAL EQUILIBRIUM
The amount of concession that an MDA makes with respect to its deadline is
Since ∆k DL is not determined by the number of trading partners, for the purpose of analyzing the time-dependent strategies of MDAs, a multi-lateral negotiation is treated as many threads of one-to-one negotiation. This section shows that (i) when an MDA adopts a conservative strategy, it requires more trading rounds to reach a consensus with its trading partner (lemma 3.1) than using either the conciliatory or linear strategy, (ii) the conservative strategy is the optimal strategy for an MDA regardless of the strategy adopted by its trading partner (lemma 3.2), and (iii) the strategies of MDAs are in equilibrium (proposition 3). ) and s in round t. Since market-driven strategies are designed for both buyer and seller agents, it can be assumed without loss of generality that b makes a concession first, hence, at round t it follows that: 
, it follows that: For all t>0, k 1,t >k 2,t (
Consequently, at round t, if k 1,t →0, then t→ T 1 and k 2,t →0. But, k 2,t →0 does not imply 
Hence, [3] that MDAs are designed to avoid making excessive concessions in favorable markets or to make inadequate compromises in unfavorable markets. Consequently, with respect to market opportunity and competition, an MDA does not have the incentive of making any other amounts of concession other than ∆k opp and ∆k com . Proposition 3 shows that the time-dependent strategies of MDAs are in equilibrium. In [10] , (τ,ε) forms the timedependent strategy of an MDA. Hence, MDAs with different ε adopts different (conservative) strategies in making concession. From a negotiator's perspective, one resists time pressure by adjusting one's level of aspiration to what is believed to be optimal within the available time [13] . In [10] , the amount of concession ∆k DL made by an MDA with respect to deadline is based on ε and regardless of the strategy adopted by its trading partner. Consequently, the strategies of MDAs are in equilibrium because with respect to opportunity, competition and deadline, every MDA does not find any incentive to deviate from making ∆k opp , ∆k com and ∆k DL respectively. Theoretical results from this work show that MDAs are stable (and are designed to behave in the desired manner). In addition to showing the desirable property of stability, which is one of the essential evaluation criteria for automated negotiation systems [11, p21] , this work also supplements and complements the empirical results obtained from previous work on MDAs [6, 10] . Both theoretical results from this work, as well as empirical results previously obtained from [6, 10] collectively show that MDAs are stable, and achieve relatively high utility and success rates. While this work (in its present stage) assumes that all negotiating parties are MDAs, future work will explore analyses of negotiation between MDAs and agents adopting other strategies. h7  h6  h5  h12  h13 I4  h11  h8  h10  h9  I3  I2   I1 
